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This paper shows that the credibility gain from permanently committing to a fixed 
exchange rate by joining the European Monetary Union can outweigh the loss from 
giving up independent monetary policy. When the central bank enjoys only limited 
credibility a pegged exchange rate regime yields a lower loss compared to an 
inflation targeting policy, even if this policy ranking would be reversed in a full-
credibility environment. There exists an initial stock of credibility that must be 
achieved for a policy-maker to adopt inflation targeting over a strict exchange rate 
targeting regime. Full credibility is not a precondition, but exposure to foreign and 
financial shocks and high steady state inflation make joining the EMU relatively 
more attractive for a given level of credibility. The theoretical results are consistent 
with empirical evidence we provide on the relationship between credibility and 
monetary regimes using a Bank of England survey of 81 central banks. 
 
JEL Classification Numbers: E52; E31; F02; F41. 
 
Keywords: Inflation targeting, Credibilty, Open Economy, Exchange Rate 
Regimes, Monetary Policy 
 Non-technical summary 
  
To carry out economic policies governments have overwhelmingly relied on two levers: 
fiscal and monetary policy. Monetary policies encompass at least three different aspects: 
the average inflation rate (this is what determines the use of a currency as a store of 
wealth over time), the response to business cycle movements in the aggregate economy, 
and the value of the currency against foreign monetary means of payment. By joining a 
monetary union, a country loses its independent choice of the price dynamics in the long 
run, the ability to respond to business cycle shocks in a way appropriate for the domestic 
economy, and irrevocably fixes the value of its unit of account against the other members 
of the monetary union.  
  
Because giving up a currency is costly, monetary unions happen among countries that 
have much to gain from sharing the same currency and stabilizing the relative price of 
goods produced by firms in each of the countries, and for which the cost of losing 
independent monetary policy are small - typically, countries that have the same 
preferences over the relative variance of output and inflation, face symmetric business 
cycle shocks, and whose economic structures are close enough to assure they will react 
similarly to the same shocks, and benefit from the same monetary policy. Indeed, the 
Maastricht Treaty requirements for countries joining the European Monetary Union are 
spelt in terms of real and nominal convergence criteria.  
  
Most of the countries that joined the EU in May 2004, and all the largest ones, have 
become working market economies only since the second half of the 1990s. They have 
undergone or are still undergoing much structural change, and expect to reap very large 
productivity gains and to converge to EU standards of living in the next decade. Since 
new EU member states are under many respects emerging market economies, there seem 
to be an important role for an independent monetary policy, at least in the short to 
medium term.  Moreover, many of the economic gains from joining the EU - from having 
access to a free-trade area to creating a more favorable environment for foreign investors 
through fiscal and legal harmonization - do not require adopting the Euro as a currency. 
Yet all of these countries announced their plans to join the European Monetary Union and 
adopt the Euro as official currency within four to six years. 
  
What is the gain for new EU member states of joining the Euro currency area so soon? 
We argue in this paper that the ability to benefit from independent monetary policy is 
constrained by the credibility of the monetary authority. The alleged benefit of 
conducting a sovereign monetary policy mostly accrues to a central bank that is able both 
to change the nominal interest rate, and to convince the private sector that it will move 
the policy instrument according to the announced commitment. Most central banks in 
emerging market economies only enjoy limited credibility. In this case, the credibility 
gain from committing to a fixed exchange rate can be larger than the loss from giving up 
independent monetary policy. Joining the EMU as soon as possible can be a desirable 
policy if it allows a EU member to choose a fully credible fixed exchange rates against 
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August 2005In the paper we take inflation targeting as the benchmark alternative policy available to 
new EU member states. While under full credibility inflation targeting performs better 
than a hard peg for a given policy objective function, the policy ranking is reversed when 
the central bank policy attains only limited credibility. For new EU members, the policy 
of adopting the Euro as official currency offers a clear advantage: the central bank 
commitment to fixing the exchange rate against the Euro is fully credible. On the other 
hand, the commitment to an inflation targeting policy can only be verified after many 
months. A central bank willing to commit to a monetary regime but with little reputation 
may be forced to choose between a credible exchange rate target, and a non-credible 
inflation target. 
  
The role of credibility changes depending on important features of the economy. The loss 
from the a lack of credibility in the monetary authority commitment becomes larger for 
more open economies and when financial shocks account for a larger share of the 
volatility driving the business cycle. These results imply that, under imperfect credibility, 
vulnerability to financial and foreign volatility impacts a small open economy business 
cycle through an additional channel, and increases the gain from joining the EMU. 
  
The trade-offs faced by new EU member states is shared by many emerging market 
economies. We report new empirical evidence on the relationship between monetary 
policy and central bank's credibility across 81 countries consistent with the theory's 
prediction. Exchange rate targeting is more popular with medium and low-credibility 
countries. Inflation targeting has been adopted in disproportionate numbers by countries 
enjoying a medium level of credibility, while it is relatively less popular among countries 
with a very high or very low level of credibility. 
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In May 2004 ten central and eastern European countries joined the European Union
(EU). Even before gaining full membership, all of these countries announced their
plans to join the European Monetary Union (EMU) and adopt the Euro as oﬃcial
currency within four to six years.
Yet most of these countries, and all the largest ones, have become working market
economies only since the second half of the 1990s. They have undergone or are still
undergoing much structural change, and expect to reap very large productivity gains
and to converge to EU standards of living in the next decade. Since new EU member
states are under many respects emerging market economies, there seem to be an
important role for an independent monetary policy, at least in the short to medium
term. In fact, of the new EU member states, only Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and
Malta have already given up monetary policy independence in favor of a hard peg
to the Euro. Moreover, many of the economic gains from joining the EU - from
having access to a free-trade area to creating a more favorable environment for foreign
investors through ﬁscal and legal harmonization - do not require adopting the Euro
as a currency.
What is the gain for new EU member states of joining the Euro currency area
so soon? This paper shows that the credibility gain from committing to a ﬁxed
exchange rate can be larger than the loss from giving up independent monetary
policy. We argue that the incentive to adopt a ﬁxed exchange rate regime, rather than
an independent monetary policy, is common to countries whose monetary authority
enjoys a limited level of credibility. Joining the EMU as soon as possible can be a
desirable policy if it allows a EU member to choose a fully credible ﬁxed exchange
rates against other EMU members over a not fully-credible independent monetary
policy.
In the paper we take inﬂation targeting as the benchmark alternative policy avail-
able to new EU member states. For countries engaging in inﬂation targeting, the
primary objective of monetary policy (established by political mandate) is to pur-
sue a quantitative inﬂation target - keeping the CPI inﬂation rate within a given
band, for example. We ﬁrst provide evidence on the relationship between alternative
monetary policies and credibility. We document that inﬂation targeting is mostly
popular among countries with medium levels of monetary policy credibility, and the
least among low-credibility countries. Exchange rate targeting is comparatively more
popular in countries with low credibility. We then show that while under full credi-
bility inﬂation targeting performs better than a hard peg for a given policy objective
function, the policy ranking is reversed when the central bank policy attains only
limited credibility1. For new EU members, the policy of adopting the Euro as oﬃcial
currency oﬀers a clear advantage: the central bank commitment to ﬁxing the exchange
rate against the Euro is fully credible. On the other hand, the commitment to an
inﬂation targeting policy can only be veriﬁed after many months. A central bank
1In full credibility DSGE models it can be shown that under certain conditions (very open econ-
omy, a high degree of liability dollarization) some exchange rate stability is desirable. Full exchange
rate stability is an optimal policy only under very restrictive assumptions (Devereux, 2004).
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choose between a credible exchange rate target, and a non-credible inﬂation target.
Monetary policies are evaluated using a DSGE New-Keynesian model of a small
open economy. The model is solved under the assumption of imperfect credibility -
the private sector expects the monetary authority to behave according to a policy
diﬀerent from the one eﬀectively adopted. The larger the distance, the least the
credibility enjoyed by the policy announced. We can quantify the initial stock of
credibility necessary for inﬂation targeting to perform better than a hard peg for
a given policy-maker loss function. Full credibility is not a precondition for a hard
p e gt op e r f o r mw o r s et h a ni n ﬂation targeting. Countries more exposed to foreign and
ﬁnancial shocks volatility or with high average inﬂation need to enjoy a comparatively
higher level of credibility for monetary independence to improve over a ﬁxed exchange
rate.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on inﬂation
targeting in emerging markets, and the role of credibility in inﬂation targeting adop-
tion. Section 3 provides evidence on the relationship between monetary regimes and
credibility. Section 4 describes the model. Section 5 discusses the results under full
and imperfect credibility. Section 6 concludes
2 Policy Choices in Emerging Markets
While most central banks have price stability as a statutory policy goal, inﬂation tar-
geting central banks publicly commit to adjust their policy so as to reach a numerical
target for the benchmark inﬂation index at a given horizon; and to explain deviations
of inﬂation from the target when this is not achieved. Svensson (1999) characterizes
inﬂation targeting as inﬂation forecast targeting: monetary policy must be adjusted
so that at the targeting horizon inﬂation is forecast to reach the target. Other policy
objectives, such as the employment level or the exchange rate, are subordinated to the
inﬂation objective. Inﬂation targeting amounts to more that a generic commitment
to price stability, and the provision of a nominal anchor for monetary policy. A key
ingredient of inﬂation-targeting monetary regimes is the central bank’s transparency
on its objective, on the evaluation of the current economic situation, on the steps the
central bank expects to take to fulﬁll the long term inﬂation goal.
A number of papers have examined what are the preconditions necessary for
emerging market economies to adopt inﬂation targeting. Amato and Gerlach (2002),
Masson et al. (1997) and Schaechter et al. (2000) identify as necessary precondi-
tions central bank independence, sound ﬁscal policy, the need for the economy to be
resilient to ﬂuctuations in exchange rate, and the availability of econometric models
for the inﬂation dynamics and monetary transmission mechanism.
The literature on monetary regime choice in less developed countries is vast.
Much attention has been devoted to the question of whether inﬂation targeting is a
viable policy for emerging market economies. Eichengreen (2002), Calvo and Mishkin
(2003), Mishkin (2004), Amato and Gerlach (2002), Carare et al. (2002) provide an
overview of emerging economies characteristics that may make inﬂation targeting a
8
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pegs. First, most emerging markets are small open economies, and neglect of the
exchange rate target may lead to high exchange rate volatility and a strong impact
on ﬁrms’ proﬁtability. Higher pass-through also means that domestic prices react
strongly to exchange rate ﬂuctuations. Second, emerging markets’ investments are
often ﬁnanced by external borrowing to a large extent, making them very vulnerable
to large negative changes in capital inﬂows (so called ’sudden stops’). If foreign cur-
rency borrowing is relatively important in the balance sheets of ﬁnancial institutions,
production ﬁrms and the government, the large depreciation following a sudden stop
under a ﬂoating exchange rate regime can lead to widespread bankruptcies.
The third and least controversial hurdle restraining emerging market economies
from adopting inﬂation targeting is the lack of credibility of the monetary authority
commitment to an announced policy. The main advantage of a ﬂoating exchange
rate regime - the ability to tailor monetary policy to the domestic economy and
the domestic business cycle - is largely lost if the monetary authority enjoys little
credibility. Changes in the interest rate will not be eﬀective in inﬂuencing ﬁrm’s
pricing decision to meet the inﬂation target, if ﬁrms do not believe the central bank
will stick to the announced policy, and will falter in the face of output ﬂuctuations.
Imperfect credibility may then require large swings in interest rates for the central
bank to achieve the inﬂation target. It will also force the central bank to adhere
strictly to the inﬂation target, so as not to lose any credibility gained. Emerging
market countries - with the notable exception of Chile - adopted inﬂation targeting
in situations of moderate inﬂation (less than 10%), using an exchange rate target to
achieve inﬂation stabilization ﬁrst.
Yet inﬂation targeting was adopted in many countries exactly to improve the
credibility record, after a history of poor inﬂation performance. In a new inﬂation
targeting regime initial credibility is low, and is earned over time. The Joint Economic
Committee of US Congress states in a report discussing inﬂation targeting (Saxton,
1997):
"Experience in several countries indicates that establishing the credi-
bility of inﬂation targeting arrangements is not easy and occurs only over
an extended time frame...It is only after a record of price stability...that
credibility develops, implying that inﬂationary expectations and risk pre-
mia of interest rates will disappear slowly over time."
But the experience of inﬂation targeting countries over time is generally regarded
as positive: they have been successful at meeting the targets, lowered the sacriﬁce
ratio, strengthened the eﬀect of forward-looking expectations on inﬂation, and reaped
a credibility gain (Corbo et al., 2001, Bernanke et al., 1999). The question left open
is why have OECD countries sustained the initial cost of a low-credibility inﬂation
targeting regime, whereas emerging markets have not found it optimal to follow suit.
The literature that examines the impact of imperfect credibility of inﬂation tar-
geting regimes within business cycle models has focused on lack of credibility of the
level of inﬂation targeted (Fraga et al., 2003, Kumhof, 2001, Weymark, 2002). But
9
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tion function. Given a level of steady state inﬂation, the way the central bank reacts
to unexpected shocks can generate excess volatility in inﬂation and the output gap.
Under rational expectations monetary policy can exploit the expectations channel:
anticipated future policy actions allow the central bank to achieve its objectives by
smaller movements of the policy instrument (Williams, 1999, Svensson, 2003, Per-
rier and Amano, 2000). If after an inﬂationary shock the central bank is expected
to hesitate in raising interest rates to bring inﬂation back to target, the monetary
policy will have to be much more contractionary than under full credibility. This
mechanism, driving our theoretical results, has received only limited attention (see
Rabanal, 2003, and Ravenna, 2004, for applications).
3 Credibility and Monetary Policy Regimes
Countries can import credibility for the monetary policy by pegging their exchange
rate, thus giving up independent monetary policy altogether. Mahadeva and Stern
(2000) report than in the period 1970-1996 39 out of 70 episodes of stable inﬂation
(deﬁned as a period of at least ﬁve years when inﬂation remains within a given
range) were achieved through exchange range targeting. The ratio raises to two thirds
when excluding episodes where average inﬂation was above 19.7%. Among developing
economies, all of the 14 episodes of stable inﬂation occurred through exchange rate
targeting. Hamann and Prati (2002) look at 51 stabilizations from high inﬂation and
ﬁnd that exchange rate based stabilizations are more likely to succeed, even after
controlling for institutional factors and pre-stabilization level of inﬂation.
This empirical work suggests that countries with a history of high inﬂation enjoy
little independent monetary policy credibility. On the other hand, there seems to be
surprisingly little evidence that resorting to inﬂation targeting rather than exchange
rate anchors is associated with higher credibility of the monetary authority.
Reliance on seigniorage is often interpreted as indicating a lack of credibility of
the monetary authority’s commitments2. Yet in the period 1980-1995 the average
reliance on seigniorage in the countries which adopted inﬂation targeting is similar to
the average of all advanced economies (Masson et al., 1997). Hu (2003) using country
panel data and quantifying credibility with a measure of the barriers against ﬁring the
central bank director and against forcing the central bank to purchase government
debt, ﬁnds credibility to be insigniﬁcantly correlated with the adoption of inﬂation
targeting.
Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2002) test whether the set of eighteen inﬂation tar-
geters over the decade 1990-1999 is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from a control group of nine
non-inﬂation targeting advanced economies. The authors show that inﬂation target-
ing is signiﬁcantly correlated only with policy instrument independence, whereas is
negatively and insigniﬁcantly correlated with statutory and goal independence, and
2Seignorage is indeed negatively correlated with Cukierman (1992) measure of central bank inde-
pendence calculated over the 1980s.
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signiﬁcantly and negatively correlated with goal independence.
If we take at face value the possibility that emerging markets lag in adopting
inﬂation targeting because they lack the credibility to implement the policy, it is
puzzling that the data do not show a stronger association between credibility of the
monetary authority and adoption of inﬂation targeting. A possible explanation is
that the relationship between credibility and inﬂation targeting is non-linear, and is
masked by looking at the full cross-country panel. If inﬂation targeting is adopted
mostly by countries lacking a good credibility record, but can’t be implemented unless
some initial stock of credibility is available, we should see mostly medium credibility
countries adopt it.
While a full empirical analysis is beyond the scope of the paper, we oﬀer evidence
in favor of this hypothesis using data from a Bank of England 1998 survey among 94
Central Banks (Mahadeva and Stern, 2000). The purpose of the survey was to provide
multi-dimensional measurement of institutional characteristics such as independence,
accountability, and transparency, operational characteristics such as the nature of
economic analyses undertaken by the banks, and policy characteristics such as the
relative emphasis placed on managing exchange rates, money, and inﬂation. The
measurement of each characteristic is based on the answers to several questions on
a numerical scale. The complementarities among survey questions and the fairly
nuanced answers that they allow makes the data very information preserving and is
likely to reduce measurement error.
Since we would like to have a measure of credibility that is the least endogenous
to inﬂation targeting, we rule out direct measures of inﬂation, such as the one used by
Cecchetti and Krause (2002). The credibility measure we adopt is constructed as the
average of answers to four independence-related questions, weighted in the same way
as in the overall independence measure calculated by the authors. The four questions
concern target independence, instrument independence, central bank ﬁnancing of
government debt, and the term of oﬃce of the governor3.W h i l er e v e r s ec a u s a t i o ni s
a potential problem of our credibility measure, it is also true that many independent
central banks achieved stable inﬂation without an explicit inﬂation target. Supporting
the use of a independence-based measure, central bank independence and a history
of honesty ranked top among ways to establish and maintain credibility in surveys
conducted among economists and professional forecasters (Blinder, 2000, Waller and
de Haan, 2004). In the Bank of England survey itself independence is ranked as the
most important component of the country’s monetary framework.
The survey also asks whether a central bank describes its policy regime as ’inﬂa-
tion targeting’. It is often the case that developing countries describe themselves as
inﬂation targeters when in fact they also try to limit exchange rate volatility. Among
OECD economies, France and Spain are reported in the survey to consider their pol-
icy as partial inﬂation targeting at a time when they were scheduled to join soon the
Euro currency area and were pegging the Deutsche Mark. Therefore we crossed the
3We omit the question whether price stability is a statutory objective since the answer is always
positive in the case of inﬂation targeters. The Appendix describes in detail the dataset.
11
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 516
August 2005survey data with de-facto exchange rate regime indicators from Reinhart and Rogoﬀ
(2002) for the year 1998. This reduced the total sample size to 81 countries. Table 1
reports the list of inﬂation targeters. For a regime to be a de-facto inﬂation targeting
policy we require the de-facto exchange rate regime to be classiﬁed in Rheinart and
Rogoﬀ (2002) as a freely ﬂoating or managed ﬂoating regime. Floating exchange rate
regimes with inﬂation above 40% (labeled ’freely falling’) are not considered inﬂa-
tion targeters. All other regimes, from currency unions to narrow moving bands, are
considered exchange-rate targeters.
Table 2 shows that the correlation between credibility and inﬂation targeting is
very close to zero. The correlation between credibility and the score recorded for
the overall degree of inﬂation focus of the monetary policy is even negative, while
the correlation between credibility and exchange rate targeting is positive and larger.
Once we adjust the data for the de-facto regime, the correlation is still low in absolute
value, but points in the direction expected. Countries with higher credibility tend to
adopt inﬂation targeting, while lack of credibility is associated with an exchange rate
target.
Splitting the sample is very revealing. We separate in Table 3 countries with a
very high credibility score (x ≥ 0.9), from countries with a very low score (x<0.7).
The largest group lies in the middle, where 36 countries enjoy a credibility score
between 0.7 and 0.9. The survey data shows its limitations: for example, it includes
the United States and Ecuador - which dollarized in 2000 and experienced an inﬂa-
tion rate above 40% at the time of the survey - in the same high credibility group.
Yet, most alternative indicators of credibility that can be built from the survey yield
similar results. What is the relative choice of monetary policy in each subgroup?
Table 4 shows that inﬂation targeting popularity grows with credibility. But most of
t h ei n c r e a s ei ni n ﬂation targeting diﬀusion among high-credibility countries rests on
the fact that among these countries the proportion of exchange rate-focused mone-
tary policies drops to about 44%. High-credibility countries tend to have independent
monetary policies - and inﬂation targeting is only one of the available options. Con-
ditional on having a ﬂoating exchange rate, only 30% of high credibility countries
choose to ﬂoat their exchange rate with an explicit inﬂation target, against over 45%
of medium-credibility countries.
A possible interpretation of this result is that central banks with high credibility
do not enjoy much advantage from inﬂation targeting. It is countries with poor in-
ﬂation performance and low credibility that beneﬁt from explicitly tying their hands.
By the same token, we should observe that among low-credibility countries which do
n o th a v ea ne x c h a n g er a t ef o c u si n ﬂation targeting is the most popular. Quite the
opposite: less than 13% of the low-credibility countries adopt inﬂation targeting.
In the next section we show how a business cycle model with imperfectly credible
monetary policy can generate a credibility gap and explain this result. If a country
does not enjoy a suﬃc i e n t l yh i g hi n i t i a ll e v e lo fc r e d i b i l i t y ,i tw i l lﬁnd an exchange
rate target more attractive than inﬂation targeting.
12
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The small open economy is described by a monetary business cycle model with nom-
inal rigidities, along the lines of Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2000), Devereux (2001, 2003),
Devereux and Lane (2001). The economy is exposed to the volatility of foreign
variables through exogenous shocks to the terms of trade, the cost of borrowing on
the international capital market and the volume of export demand for the home-
produced good. As in Monacelli (2004) and Gali and Monacelli (2005) we assume
complete pass-through from the foreign to the domestic price of imported goods4.
The domestic (H) sector produces a consumption-good basket that is both con-
sumed by domestic households and exported to the foreign (F) sector, in exchange
for a foreign-produced consumption good. Firms in the home and foreign country set
prices in their respective currency and do not discriminate across markets, so that the
law of one price holds for each traded good. Domestic ﬁrms in the monopolistically
competitive production sector can update the price with probability less than one
in any period, as in the Calvo (1983) staggered price adjustment model. We allow
the monetary authority to set a positive steady state money growth rate, and do not
assume steady state price indexation in the production sector.
Households trade on the international capital market a foreign currency denomi-
nated bond yielding an exogenous nominal riskless return, and hold a positive amount
of the zero-interest domestic nominal asset because of the utility it yields.
4.1 Households and Foreign Sector
There is a continuum of inﬁnitely lived households, indexed by j ∈ [0,1]. Households’




























where Mt/Pt is real money balances, Nt is the amount of labor service supplied, Dt is
an aggregate preferences shifter. Ct is an aggregate consumption index deﬁned over
a basket of domestic (CH)a n df o r e i g n( CF)g o o d s :
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with associated price index:
Pt =[ ( 1− γ)(PH,t)1−ρ + γ(PF,t)1−ρ]
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1−ρ (2)
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goods indexed by i ∈ [0,1]. We assume preferences over the individual goods are
deﬁned by a standard CES aggregator, so that the expenditure minimization problem


































































t − τt (5)
where vt (v∗
t) is the price of a zero-coupon riskless bond priced in domestic (for-
eign) currency, Bt (B∗
t ) is the amount of domestic (foreign) asset purchased, Wt is
the wage rate, Πj is the share of proﬁt from the monopolistic ﬁrms rebated to the
household, and τ is a lump sum government tax.

















and the marginal utility of consumption is MUCt = Dt
Ct
5. The household maxi-
mization problem yields as well the money demand equation, not reported here. Since
we assume the central bank policy instrument is the nominal interest rate, money
demand only establishes the money stock the central bank has to supply in order to
achieve the desired level of the nominal interest rate.
The Euler equations for the domestic and foreign bond can be combined to yield










t) − (1 + it)
¸¾
=0 (8)
5Since in the symmetric equilibrium all households’ choices are identical we drop the j index.
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t is the gross nominal interest rate and (1 + i∗
t)=v∗−1
t is
the interest rate paid by domestic residents to borrow on the international capital
market6. Foreign households’ demand for the home-produced good is also assumed













t is an exogenous stochastic process and St = PF,t/PH,t deﬁnes the home
country terms of trade.
4.2 Firms
The home production sector is made up of a continuum of ﬁrms i indexed on the
unit interval. Domestic ﬁrms produce goods employing labour services supplied by
households and a production technology At:
YH,t(i)=AtNt(i) (9)
In every period t, ﬁrms adjust their prices with probability (1−θp). This assump-
tion generates the well know time-dependent Calvo (1983) pricing model used in the
New Keynesian literature. The problem of the ﬁrm setting the price at time t consists























t = PH,tMCt =
Wt
MPLt
where MCN and MC are the nominal and real marginal cost, MPL is the marginal
productivity of labor. In (11), YH,t+i(i) is the demand function for ﬁrm’s output
at time t + i, conditional on the price set i periods in advance at time t, PH,t(i).







H,t is foreign demand for good i. The stochastic discount factor between























6To ensure stationarity, following Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2001) we assume that i
∗is given by
the exogenous world interest rate h i
∗ plus a premium increasing in the real value of the country’s
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does not return the standard forward-looking New Keynesian inﬂation equation (as
derived, among others, in Monacelli, 2004). The Appendix provides a detailed deriva-
tion.
4.3 Government and central bank behaviour
The government rebates the seigniorage revenues to the households in the form of
lump-sum transfers, so that in any time t the government budget is balanced: −τt =
Ms
t −Ms
t−1. In the steady state the central bank follows a constant money growth rate
policy. When the economy is away from the steady state, the central bank monetary
policy is described by an interest rate rule, where the instrument is a function of the





L =[ sL,ε i]
where iss is the steady state level of the interest rate, st is the vector of state and
control variables, sL is the vector parametrizing the policy rule L,a n dεi is a random
shock summarising exogenous shifts in monetary policy.
4.4 Market Clearing and Aggregate Equilibrium
The assumptions of symmetric equilibrium and constant return to scale production
allow a straightforward derivation of the equilibrium equations for the aggregate
economy. Market clearing in the domestic economy requires





Since all ﬁrms face identical marginal costs, any ﬁrm belonging to the fraction (1−θp)
resetting the price at t chooses the same new optimal price: ˜ PH,t(i)= ˜ PH,t. The








The equilibrium in the money market requires Ms
t = Md
t . Each household pur-
chases an equal amount C
j
H,t(i) so that C
j
H,t(i)=CH,t(i). The quantities purchased of
each good i will depend upon the price currently charged, which diﬀers across ﬁrms.
The labor market clears in every period. Since all households are identical, equilib-
rium in the domestic asset markets implies Bt =0 . Households can borrow from the
rest of the world, so that B∗ can be non-zero. The evolution of the foreign asset




Working Paper Series No. 516
August 2005We assume that the logarithm of the exogenous preference shifter Dt,t h et e c h -
nology shock At, the world interest rate ˜ ı∗
t,i m p o r t s ’p r i c eP∗
F,t and aggregate foreign
consumption demand C∗
t follow a ﬁrst order autoregressive stochastic processes, with
the random innovation εj,t ∼ N(0,σ2
j). The model parametrization is described in
the Appendix.
4.5 Solution method
The model is solved by taking a linear approximation around the non-stochastic
steady state of the economy equilibrium. We allow the private sector belief of the
monetary policy rule L followed by the central bank to be diﬀerent from the true
policy adopted. This methodology lets us examine the equilibrium achieved when
the central bank announces and enforces a given policy, but the private sector forms
expectations according to its own believes of the central bank policy rule. We la-
bel ’imperfect credibility’ any equilibrium where the private sector expectations are
diﬀerent from the rational expectation solution. The credibility gap (the distance
between the announced and the believed policy) can be exogenously speciﬁed. We
assume the only model-inconsistent believes concern the systematic reaction of the
monetary authority to the state of the economy.
Let ˜ EL
t indicate the expectation of a variable under the belief that the central
bank follows the policy rule L. Write the model in matrix form as
0=FEt(st+1)+Gst + Hst−1 + Rεt (13)
where both control and state variables are elements of the vector st,a n dw h e r e
ε is the vector of i.i.d. innovations to the exogenous stochastic variables. Under the
monetary policy rule La, the solution of the rational expectations model is:
st = Γast−1 + Λaεt (14)
If the private sector expects the central bank to behave according to the policy
rule Lb, expectations are consistent with the rational expectation equilibrium deﬁned
by:
st = Γbst−1 + Λbεt (15)
The structural model becomes:
0=F ˜ Eb
t(st+1)+Gst + Hst−1 + Rεt
= F[Γbst]+Gst + Hst−1 + Rεt (16)
which can be solved yielding a reduced form:
st = Γcst−1 + Λcεt
where Γc = −(FΓb + G)
−1H and Λc = −(FΓb + G)
−1R. Clearly (Γa,Λa) 6=
(Γc,Λc) except when (Γb,Λb)=( Γa,Λa), in which case we obtain the RE equilib-
rium. But it is also true that (Γb,Λb) 6=( Γc,Λc). Over time, the private sector
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We choose not to include a learning dynamics for two reasons. First, monetary policy
regime reforms are usually coordinated between monetary authorities and the gov-
ernment (they usually happen together with an overhaul of the ﬁscal policy, so as
to enhance the credibility of the commitment). Governments often have very high
discount rates - they are unlikely to bet on the learning speed of the private sector
when evaluating the relative performance of alternative policies7.T h e r e f o r e i n o u r
model the monetary authority assumes the private sector assigns probability one to
the event ”monetary policy will be conducted according to regime Lb”. Eﬀectively,
we are assuming the policy-maker ranks policies according to a worst-case scenario
where his credibility never improves. Second, we are interested in evaluating what is
the maximum credibility gap that would still make inﬂation targeting perform better
than exchange rate targeting for a given a policy objective function. Introducing
learning dynamics adds an extra layer to the problem which muddles the result: a
policy rule may in fact be preferable because it speeds up learning. Even if under full
credibility an inﬂation targeting were optimal, with learning the policy-maker may
ﬁn do p t i m a lt oc o n v e r g et oi n ﬂation targeting by adopting a sequence of intermediate
policies that trade-oﬀ the gain from being close to the optimal one with the gain from
faster learning.
5 Credibility and Policy Performance
This section discusses the ranking of alternative monetary policies as the credibility
gap changes. The performance of alternative policy rules is assessed by assuming the
policy-maker objective function depends on deviations from the steady state levels of
domestic producers’ price inﬂation, the consumption gap and interest rates:
Loss = λcVa r[ct − e ct]+λπVa r[πH,t]+λiVa r[it] (17)
where e c is the ﬂexible-price level of consumption. Unless explicitly stated, we will
assume λi =0 . Ranking policies using the household utility function would require
solving for a second order approximation to the equilibrium, and is not feasible since
the solution method under imperfect credibility relies on a ﬁrst-order approxima-
tion. The policy objective in eq. (17) assumes that the monetary authority aims
at replicating the ﬂexible-price equilibrium. Since prices cannot be adjusted opti-
mally, individual ﬁrms’ markups are heterogeneous, and the dynamics of aggregate
consumption c will deviate from the ﬂexible price level e c. In addition, the existence of
the nominal rigidity implies that inﬂation is costly because it generates dispersion in
relative prices. Foreign goods are uniformly priced, therefore only domestic inﬂation
πH introduces a welfare-reducing distortion. Gali and Monacelli (2005) show that in
a New Keynesian full pass-through model stabilising producer price inﬂation is opti-
mal, and that the utility-based welfare criterion to evaluate the cost of sub-optimal
7Unless they have available a clear way of signalling the committment, such as entry into the EU
signalled the committemnt to join the European Monetary Union for member states.
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volatility. This result hinges on a number of restrictive assumption which are not met
in our model. Benigno and Benigno (2003) prove that in general the ﬂexible price
equilibrium is not welfare-maximizing because of the expenditure switching eﬀect of
the terms of trade in an open economy8
The policy-maker loss function includes a consumption gap, to take into account
how policy impacts on the composition of the domestic and foreign good basket
entering the household utility function. Using the domestic output gap does not alter
qualitatively the results. We also examine the case of a policy objective (17) expressed
in terms of consumer price inﬂation π rather than producer price inﬂation. Inﬂation
targeting countries usually choose a measure of core CPI inﬂation as the policy target
for ease of communication and transparency. A large literature (Devereux and Engel,
2003, Sutherland, 2005) shows that if pass-through is less than complete, exchange
rate ﬂuctuations have a direct impact on welfare. Including CPI inﬂation implicitly
introduces the exchange rate volatility in the policy objective. Finally, we allow for
the possibility that the policy objective may include interest rate volatility. Lowe
and Ellis (1997) justify such policy-maker preferences with institutional reasons and
concerns about ﬁnancial market fragility. The policy-maker is assumed to assign equal
weights to the policy targets: λπ = λc =1and, when the interest rate target is
explicitly included, λi =1 .
Inﬂation targeting has been alternatively modeled as an instrument rule where a
measure of inﬂation or expected inﬂation enters the policy-maker feedback rule (an
inﬂation-targeting instrument rule: see McCallum and Nelson, 2004), or as the min-
imization of a loss function increasing in the deviation between the target variables
and the target levels (an optimal targeting rule Svensson, 1999). In some simple mod-
els, the two approaches are equivalent (Gali, 2002, Eichengreen, 2002). In general,
a targeting rule will be implemented by a policy equation where the interest rate is
a function of all state variables, so an instrument rule where the interest rate is a
function of inﬂation only will be suboptimal, even if the central banker’s loss function
depends exclusively on inﬂation.
We model inﬂation targeting as an instrument rule, as in Devereux (2003) and
Parrado and Velasco (2002). One advantage of this approach is that optimal targeting
rules can be very sensitive to the micro-structure of the model, and therefore less
robust. Simple rules instead seem to perform reasonably well in a variety of models
(Williams, 1999). Moreover, simple rules are easier to monitor for private agents,
and this increases the central bank’s ability to credibly commit to a strategy.














where ωπ, ωe ≥ 0 are the feedback coeﬃcients to domestic inﬂation and nominal
exchange rate depreciation. Strict inﬂation targeting would require ωe =0 . Am a n -
8Walsh (2003) and Woodford (2003) discuss the implications for welfare of nominal price rigidities
in the New Keynesian model. Clarida et al. (2001) extends the results to an open economy model.
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more the policy regime will approximate a ﬁxed exchange rate regime. As ωe →∞ ,
the country gives up monetary sovereignty. The welfare implications of domestic in-
ﬂation targeting rules are examined by Devereux (2003), Gali and Monacelli (2005)
and Parrado and Velasco (2002). Targeting πH is a appropriate given the policy
objective (17) is expressed in terms of producer price inﬂation. Including CPI in-
ﬂation in eq. (18) would also blur the comparison across regimes, since the model
implies πt =( 1−γ)πH,t +γ(∆et +π∗
F,t) and a CPI target would allow exchange rate
movements to aﬀect policy beyond the explicit exchange rate target ∆et/∆eSS.





¢¤(1−χ) [(1 + it−1,t)]
χ εi,t (19)
where χ ∈ [0,1) is the degree of smoothing and the exogenous shock εi,t represents
non-systematic, unexpected movements in monetary policy, arising for example from
policy mistakes. A high degree of interest rate smoothing is a recurrent feature of
estimated policy feedback rules (Clarida et al., 1998). Woodford (2003) ﬁnds that
optimal monetary policy rules in the closed economy New Keynesian setting are
associated with large policy inertia, even for λi =0 .
Let the inﬂation targeting regime adopted by the central bank be described by:
La =[ ωπ =2 ,ωe =0 .1,χ=0 .8,ε i]
Under full credibility, private sector expectations are consistent with the model:
Lb = La
What are the consequences of imperfect credibility? Assume private sector expec-
tations are formed according to Lb 6= La,w h e r eLb indicates policy believes ranging
from Llow
b =[ ωπ =0 .1,ωe =1 ]to L
high
b = La. The credibility gap is given by the dis-
tance between the vectors La and Lb. As the credibility of the central bank improves,
ωe decreases towards the true value of 0.1 and ωπ contemporaneously increases to-
wards the true value of 2 9.T h e v a l u e χ is ﬁxed at 0.8, and the distribution of
εi is known. When credibility is low and Lb = Llow
b the private sector expects the
central bank to heavily manage the exchange rate, and to put only a small weight
on producer price inﬂation deviations from the target. In other words, the central
bank is not believed to react with an aggressive contractionary policy as the inﬂation
rate deviates from the announced target, nor to subordinate the exchange rate to the
inﬂation rate target.




b ]. The surface in the ﬁgure represents the loss achieved under a ﬁxed ex-
change rate regime. The monetary authority complies with the announced policy
9We allow for a positive level of ωe in the inﬂation targeting regime, to account for the fact
that emerging small open economies may be concerned with smoothing the volatility of the nominal
exchange rate, and that inﬂation targeting regimes do not ﬁlter out completely the impact of exchange
rate movements in their deﬁnition of target inﬂation rate (tipycally a measure of ’core inﬂation’).
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geting regime if Lb 6= La. The advantage of an exchange rate targeting lies in the
transparency of the commitment: it can be veriﬁed on a daily basis. In the case
of a currency union, reneging on the commitment carries a very high political cost.
Given this advantage, the central bank will choose an (imperfectly credible) inﬂation
targeting policy if it yields a loss no larger than an exchange rate peg. What is the
initial stock of credibility necessary for this to happen? The ﬁgure shows that for Lb
approximately equal to [ωπ =0 .35,ω e =0 .95] the two policies yield the same loss.
Even given a substantial credibility gap, the policy-maker will ﬁnd inﬂation targeting
a better monetary regime. But as the credibility gap increases, a ﬁxed exchange rate
regime guarantees a lower loss. For Lb = Llow
b , the inﬂation targeting regime nearly
doubles the loss of the exchange rate peg.
If the policy-maker target is deﬁned in terms of consumer price inﬂation, rather
than producer price inﬂation, the cost of the credibility gap increases, as the vari-
ability of the exchange rate which now enters the objective function increases rapidly
with the credibility gap. For the lowest level of credibility, targeting πH implies an
excess loss of about 100% relative to the ﬁxed exchange rate regime. If the objective
function includes CPI rather than PPI inﬂation the value of the excess loss rises to
over 300%. As a consequence, the initial stock of credibility necessary for inﬂation
targeting to yield a loss lower than an exchange rate peg rises.
5.1 The Credibility Gap
To illustrate the cost of the credibility gap, ﬁgure 1 also displays the loss as La varies
in the range [Llow
b ,L
high
b ] under full credibility. Figure 2 reproduces ﬁgure 1b and
shows how to interpret the cost from the credibility gap. Let La|Lb indicate the loss
associated with policy La conditional on believes Lb. Deﬁne the credibility gap as the
loss La|Lb − La|La generated by imperfect credibility. This loss can be read as the
sum of two terms:
La|Lb − La|La =[ Lb|Lb − La|La]+[ La|Lb − Lb|Lb]
The ﬁrst term [Lb|Lb − La|La] is the policy gap. This is the loss that the policy-
maker faces if the private sector believes policy is described by L = Lb and monetary
policy is conducted according to the expectations. It represents the cost associated
with employing a policy that performs worse than La. But the cost of imperfect
credibility does not only correspond to the policy-maker being forced to use the
worse policy Lb conditional on an expected policy Lb. Holding ﬁxed the believes
Lb assume the policy-maker could adopt any other policy. The extra loss generated
by implementing policy La rather than policy Lb is the implementation gap and
is equal to [La|Lb − Lb|Lb]. The monetary authority faces this cost only because is
trying to implement a policy diﬀerent from the expected one - it has to ’ﬁght’ wrong
expectations by the private sector. As La changes, the mapping between the state
variables and the private sector expectations is constant, and all that changes is the
policy actually implemented. In other words, the credibility gap does not simply
originates in the private sector holding expectations of a worse policy, but also in
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variables despite the private sector believes. Under imperfect credibility, the policy-
maker should choose policies that perform well conditional on the true private sector
expectations, rather than conditional on model-consistent expectations. For given
expectations, the policy ranking faced by the monetary authority may diﬀer.
The inﬂation targeting policy La performs well under full credibility, but carries
a very high implementation cost for low levels of credibility, making an exchange rate
peg a more attractive option. From ﬁgure 1 it is clear that the implementation gap
narrows rapidly as credibility improves, and with a producer price inﬂation objective
function goes to zero already for Lb =[ ωπ =1 ,ωe =0 .6]. Including πH in the
loss function (17) rather than CPI inﬂation implies that the implementation gap
diminishes considerably, dropping by about 50% for Lb = Llow
b . Intuitively, imperfect
credibility raises the volatility of the nominal exchange rate, so that compared to the
full credibility case the excess volatility of π is larger than that of πH.
The intuition for the cost of a credibility gap can be illustrated by looking at
the impulse response function to an annualized 1% expansionary policy shock to it
(Figure 3). Consider the policies La =[ ωπ =2 ,ω e =0 .1] and Lb =[ ωπ =0 .4,
ωe =0 .9]. Under full credibility, the policy Lb will generate a larger increase in
inﬂation and output, a standard result in a New Keynesian model. Firms increase
t h ep r i c eb yal a r g e ra m o u n ti ft h i sw i l lt r i g g e ras m a l l e rf u t u r ei n t e r e s tr a t eh i k eb y
the monetary authority. Since under Lb the central bank responds to the nominal
exchange rate depreciation by tightening monetary policy, the decrease in it below
the steady state value following the initial expansionary shock is smaller than under
policy La. With imperfect credibility, policy La implies the central bank response
to the exchange rate depreciation is much more muted. Therefore, given the state
of the economy it is lower than it would be conditional on Lb. Eﬀectively, in the
believes of the private sector this translates into a larger initial expansionary shock.
Given ˜ Eb
tπH,t+1 and ˜ Eb
tit+1 domestic inﬂation will be higher than it would be under
a fully credible policy Lb. Domestic inﬂation depends on ˜ Eb
tmct+k for k =1 ,2... and
these expectations are built conditional on the monetary policy shock being more
expansionary than it really is, leading to a larger increase in domestic prices.
Conditional on La the domestic inﬂation increase nearly doubles under imperfect
credibility. Since an increase in πH requires a drop in the average markup, the larger
drop also leads to a large increase in output and consumption. Because this increase
is all due to the nominal rigidity, it fully translates into an (ineﬃcient) consumption
gap. This mechanism, present in varying degrees depending on the shock considered,
leads to the larger volatility in consumption gap and inﬂation and to the loss observed
in Figure 1.
The credibility gap does not necessarily work against the central bank objectives.
Table 5 shows that there are instances in which if Lb 6= La the objective function
loss improves. If the central bank could convince the private sector that it will follow
the policy Lb whereas the true policy is La - implying a higher degree of exchange
rate management - the loss would improve by 35%. Unfortunately this policy is not
time-consistent and is not a rational expectations equilibrium: it implies the central
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well known result in the optimal policy literature: if the central bank could follow a
time-inconsistent policy, it could achieve a higher welfare. In the present case, it is
advantageous to smooth exchange rate ﬂuctuations without letting the private sector
know the true central bank aversion to a volatile exchange rate.
5.1.1 Interest Rate Smoothing
The policy rule (19) assumes interest rate smoothing in the behaviour of the monetary
authority, but in ﬁgure 1 the cost of interest rate ﬂuctuations did not enter the
objective function. Accounting explicitly for the cost of interest rate volatility does
not alter substantially the results. Figure 2b compares the credibility gap for λi =0
and λi =1 . The loss from inﬂation targeting is lower than in a ﬁxed exchange
rate regime for values of ωπ larger than 0.4. The credibility gap increases, but the
initial stock of credibility necessary to implement inﬂation targeting does not increase
proportionally, since the performance of a ﬁx e de x c h a n g er a t er e g i m ew o r s e n sw h e n
λi =1 . Since any movement in the foreign interest rate has to be mirrored by the
domestic interest rate, the loss will necessarily be larger as λi increases.
5.1.2 Steady State Inﬂation
Most developing countries experience average inﬂation rates larger than industrialized
economies. The steady state inﬂation level has a considerable impact on the loss
from a credibility gap. Figure 4a compares the loss under a steady state with full
price stability against the standard case considered so far of a positive annualized
6% steady state inﬂation rate. While many emerging markets experience far higher
inﬂation rates, the Calvo pricing framework we adopt is inadequate to model high-
inﬂation economies (see Ascari, 2004). Nevertheless this comparison gives interesting
indications as to the impact of steady state inﬂation on the adoption of inﬂation
targeting under imperfect credibility.
A zero steady state inﬂation reduces the loss relative to the full credibility case
for every policy belief Lb, and proportionally more for very low levels of credibility.
At the same time the loss associated with a pegged exchange rates barely moves.
The net result is that the initial stock of credibility necessary to implement inﬂation
targeting is reduced. In the case of the loss function deﬁn e di nt e r m so fP P Ii n ﬂation,
given any belief Lb inﬂation targeting yields a lower loss than a credible exchange rate
peg. This result does not hold for a loss function deﬁned in terms of CPI inﬂation:
the volatility of the exchange rate remains very high for low levels of credibility, so
the drop in consumption gap volatility gives a smaller percentage contribution to the
total loss decrease.
When steady state inﬂation is positive, πH is not only a function of future ex-
pected real marginal costs - it depends also negatively on output. Whenever a shock
generates a positive correlation between output and domestic inﬂation, πH increases
comparatively less, so that the systematic portion of monetary policy implies a smaller
interest rate reaction, leading to larger output movements in equilibrium. Under im-
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the consumption gap.
5.2 The Degree of Openness and Exposure to Financial Volatility
Two widely studied vulnerabilities of small open developing economies are the expo-
sure to foreign shocks and to ﬁnancial instability. We examine how these issues bear
on the relative attractiveness of inﬂation targeting under imperfect credibility.
We assume that the domestic basket bias in the consumption aggregate, which is
equal to steady state share of imports over domestic output, drops from γ =0 .4 to
γ =0 .2. Table 6 shows the implications for the objective function under a number of
believed policies Lb. The ratio of the inﬂation targeting loss conditional on believes
Lb and of the exchange rate peg drops faster below 100% when γ =0 .2. For a more
closed economy inﬂation targeting becomes an attractive option for lower levels of
credibility. But this result does not depend on a smaller loss from the credibility gap.
In fact the implementation gap [La|Lb − Lb|Lb] expressed as a multiple of the full
credibility policy Lb|Lb increases for a more closed economy. The incentive to adopt
inﬂation targeting comes from the very poor performance of the ﬁxed exchange rate
regime. Stabilizing the exchange rate in a more closed economy leads to movement
in the policy rate that increase the volatility of the consumption gap.
Table 7 asks what is the relative importance of ﬁnancial shocks. We set all
exogenous variables to their steady state values, except for εi and ι∗
t. All the volatility
in the economy is caused by relative money supply adjustment. Movements in εi and
ι∗
t can also be interpreted as changes in risk and country premia for borrowing on the
international ﬁnancial market. Obviously the absolute level of volatility is reduced,
s i n c ew eh a v ee l i m i n a t e dp a r to ft h ee x o g e n o us variability in the model. This though
does not imply that the credibility gap will decrease. In fact, the loss under an
imperfectly credible inﬂation target relative to an exchange rate peg increases, and
so does the implementation gap. For the lowest level of credibility, the loss under
inﬂation targeting increases from 232% to over 300% of the loss under an exchange
rate peg. In countries where the volatility of shocks on the ﬁnancial markets is
relatively important for the business cycle, the attractiveness of a inﬂation targeting
under imperfect credibility diminishes.
5.3 Targeting Horizons
The distance between the policy coeﬃcients deﬁning the instrument rules La and Lb
does not oﬀer a clear measure of the credibility gap. A possible credibility metric is
the distance between the targeting horizon implied by La and the one implied by the
private sector believes about the policy rule.
To formalize this concept, we need to specify what is a ’targeting horizon’ when
the central bank uses an inﬂation targeting instrument rule. We deﬁne the target-
ing horizon as the number of quarters it takes for domestic inﬂa t i o nt od r o pb e l o w
0.1% after an initial unexpected expansionary monetary shock of 1% (annualized
rates). While taking as numerical target for domestic inﬂation a ﬁgure of one tenth
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(relative) results. In a linear model, impulse responses to a shock of any size scale
proportionally.
Figure 4b displays the targeting horizon corresponding to the range of rules con-
sidered in Lb. Policy rule La implies a targeting horizon between 3 and 4 quarters,
while the rule Lb w i t ht h el o w e s tf e e d b a c kc o e ﬃcient to inﬂation gives a targeting
horizon of about 2.3 years. This means that in the case considered in Figure 1, the
inﬂation targeting loss drops below the loss associated with a strict exchange rate tar-
get as soon as the private sector believes the targeting horizon to be approximately
smaller than 6.5 quarters (5.5 in the case of the CPI loss function). In other words,
if the private sector believes the targeting horizon to be more than 85% longer than
announced (60% in the case of the CPI loss function), the central bank will ﬁnd
that a credible hard peg - such as joining a currency area and giving up monetary
sovereignty - is a more desirable policy.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
New EU member states plan to join the EMU and give up monetary policy inde-
pendence by the end of the decade, despite large structural diﬀerences still existing
against current EMU members’ economies. Most of these countries, and all the largest
ones, have become working market economies only since the second half of the 1990s,
have undergone or are still undergoing much structural change, expect to reap very
large productivity gains and to converge to EU standards of living in the next decade.
This paper shows that the credibility gain obtained by joining the EMU and thus
credibly adopting a ﬁxed exchange rates against other EMU members can be larger
than the loss from the narrowing of the monetary policy choice set.
Solving a small open economy model with staggered price adjustment under the
assumption of imperfect credibility we obtain two results. First, a country needs an
initial stock of credibility for inﬂation targeting to lower the policy-maker loss relative
to an exchange rate peg. The result rests on the assumption that a ﬁxed exchange
rate enjoys full credibility, as would be the case for new EU member states joining the
Euro currency area, while an inﬂation targeting regime may be perceived as being
less aggressive towards inﬂation than it actually is. We show that the initial stock
of credibility is lower if the monetary authority loss function is deﬁn e di nt e r m so f
producer rather than consumer price inﬂation, and for lower levels of steady state
inﬂation. The cost from the credibility gap can be substantial, and originates partly
from the private sector expectations behaving according to a diﬀerent policy (the
policy gap), and partly from the cost of implementing a policy despite the mistaken
private sector expectations (the implementation gap).
Second, the loss from the credibility gap becomes larger for more open economies
and when ﬁnancial shocks account for a larger share of the volatility driving the
business cycle. These results imply that, under imperfect credibility, vulnerability to
ﬁnancial and foreign volatility impacts a small open economy business cycle through
an additional channel, and increases the gain from joining the EMU.
25
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 516
August 2005Finally, we report new empirical evidence on the relationship between monetary
policy and central bank’s credibility consistent with the theory’s prediction. Ex-
change rate targeting is more popular with medium and low-credibility countries.
Inﬂation targeting has been adopted in disproportionate numbers by countries enjoy-
ing a medium level of credibility, while it is relatively less popular among countries
w i t hav e r yh i g ho rv e r yl o wl e v e lo fc r e d i b i l i t y .
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The data used to build the credibility index measure is taken from a survey of 81 national
monetary institutions collected by the Bank of England. The survey data is described in
Mahadeva, L. and Sterne, G., (2000), ’Monetary Frameworks in a Global Context’, Bank of
England. Original data can be downloaded at the Bank of England website.
The credibility measure is a weighted average of the answers given to the ﬁve questions
contained in Table A.5 of the survey:
Table A.5:   Independence Scores 
Wt
Independence score (weighted total) 6.5
1.  Statutory/legal objectives focus on price stability? 1
2.  Target Independence 1
3.  Instrument independence 2
4.  Central Bank financing of government deficit 2
5.  Term of Office of Governor 0.5
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August 2005The answers are given on a scale ranging from zero to one. For reasons described in the
main text, the answer to the ﬁrst question is omitted in building the average independence
score used as a measure of credibility. An answer equal to 1 in questions 2 to 5 will therefore
result in an independence score of 1.
The correlation indices in table 2 for the scores ”Credibility, policy regime described as
inﬂation targeting” and ”Credibility, policy regime described as exchange rate targeting” are
computed using the numerical value reported in the survey in the answers to question 1 in
Table A.2 and A.4:
Table A.2  Exchange rate focus Wt
Weighted Total 4
1.  Regime Described as Exchange rate targeting? 1
3.  Degree to which the exchange rate is fixed ? 1
2.  Rank of objectives? 1
4.  Degree to which exchange rate prevails in policy conflicts? 1
Table A.4 Inflation focus
Weighted Total 4
1.  Regime Described as inflation targeting? 1
3.  Specific target/monitoring range published now? 1
2.  Rank of objectives? 1
4.  Inflation prevails in policy conflicts? 1
De facto classiﬁcation for monetary policy regimes is obtained from Reinhart, Carmen
M. and Kenneth S. Rogoﬀ (2002), ’The Modern History of Exchange Rate Arrangements: A
Reinterpretation’, NBER Working Paper w8963. A country is classiﬁed as an exchange rate
targeter if its policy regime falls among one of the following de facto regimes: moving band
that is narrower or equal to +/- 2%; de facto crawling band that is narrower or equal to +/-
5%; pre-announced crawling band that is wider or equal to +/- 2%; de facto crawling band
that is narrower or equal to +/- 2%; de facto crawling peg; pre-announced crawling band that
is narrower or equal to +/- 2%; pre-announced crawling peg; de facto peg; pre-announced
horizontal band that is narrower or equal to +/- 2%; pre-announced peg or currency board
arrangement; no separate legal tender. These regimes correspond to category 1 to 11 of the 14
categories used in the classiﬁcation. A country is not classiﬁed as an exchange rate targeter
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August 2005In building tables 1 to 4, a country is considered a ’de facto inﬂation targeter’ if it describes
its regime as inﬂation targeting in Table A.4 of the Bank of England survey and at the same
time is not classiﬁed as a de facto exchange rate targeter. Some countries describe themselves
as ’partial inﬂation targeters’. Of these group, only Slovakia is not a de facto exchange rate
targeter, and oﬃcially describes itself as an implicit inﬂation targeter (Nell, 2004). Since
it announces a yearly target for the inﬂation rate, it has been classiﬁed among inﬂation
targeters. Ecuador and Kyrgyz are classiﬁed as ’freely falling’ regimes in 1998, with inﬂation
rates above 40%. They are not counted among inﬂation targeters even if their monetary
policy did not have an exchange rate anchor in 1998. Singapore moved to Managed Floating
at the very end of 1998, and it is counted among the ’exchange rate targeting’ countries.
The last year for which the de facto monetary policy regime classiﬁcation is available in
the Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2002) dataset is 2001. At that time, among the countries included
in the survey Chile, Korea, Poland, South Africa and Poland had joined the de facto inﬂation
targeters group. Among the countries for which the Bank of England survey results are
unavailable, Brazil, Colombia and Philippines had joined the de facto inﬂation targeters
group.
The data used for building tables 1 to 4 in the paper are available at the author’s homepage
http://ic.ucsc.edu/~fravenna/home.
7.2 Parametrization
The model parametrization follows closely the recent examples of New Keynesian models with
complete pass through in Monacelli (2004) and Gali and Monacelli (2005). Devereux (2001,
2003), Devereux and Lane (2001) and Natalucci and Ravenna (2003), provide references to
empirical studies from which some of the parameters used in the International Business Cycle
literature are drawn.
In the households’ preferences, the discount rate β is set to 0.99 and the elasticity of
substitution between home and foreign consumption baskets ρ is set to 1. We assume a
labour supply elasticity equal to 1/2, implying the parameter η is equal to 2. Using a labour
supply elasticity as large as 2 or as small as 1/3 did not alter qualitatively the results. The
probability of price adjustment (1 −θp) in the ﬁrm maximization problem is assumed equal
to 0.25, implying an average price duration of four quarters. The elasticity of substitution
between goods ϑ is equal to 11. As a consequence, the ﬂexible-price markup is equal to
10%. Gali and Monacelli (2005) choose a higher value, but since we assume a positive rate
of money growth rate and no indexation to steady state inﬂation, the steady state mark-up
in our model is larger than the ﬂexible-price one. The home-goods bias γ is equal in steady
state to the ratio between imports and domestic output. We take as a model small open
economy Canada, and parametrize γ to the Canadian import/output ratio, approximately
equal to 0.4. World demand for the home-produced good is assumed to be less price-elastic
than domestic demand, and we choose a foreign price-elasticity of demand ρ∗ =0 .5. The
value γ∗ does not aﬀect the loglinearized solution, since in steady state we let the amount of
exports to be endogenously determined so as to normalize the terms of trade to 1.
In the log-linearized model, the exogenous stochastic processes for the preference shifter,
the technology shock, the world interest rate, the imports’ price and the aggregate foreign
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dt = ρddt−1 + εd,t










The technology shock process is parametrized following Gali and Monacelli (2005), who
estimate a ﬁrst order autoregression for HP-ﬁltered (log) labour productivity in Canada over
the sample 1963:1 2002:4 and ﬁnd ρa =0 .66 and σa =0 .0071. Over the same period, they
estimate the parameters for the foreign consumption demand using HP ﬁltered U.S. (log)
GDP to be ρd =0 .86 and σd =0 .0078. Over the last decade, the share of total Canadian
export demand going to the U.S averaged approximately 80%. To parametrize the process for
the world interest rate we use data on the U.S. 3-month T-Bill quarterly yield, and estimate
over the sample 1963:1 2002:4 ρi∗ =0 .95 and σi∗ =0 .0021. The stochastic process for the
imported good price level is estimated using data for the Canadian Laspeyres ﬁxed weight
price index for imports from the U.S., 1992:1 to 2000:2. Estimation results in ρp =0 .89 and
σp =0 .015. Following Monacelli (2004) the standard deviation of the preference shock σd is
set to 0.011 and the autocorrelation parameter is set to ρd =0 .9. We assume the domestic
policy innovation εi is an i.i.d. shock with σi =0 .0015.
The model is log-linearized around a zero-net foreign asset steady state. The steady
state money growth rate, equal to the steady state inﬂation, is equal to 6% in the baseline
parametrization.
7.3 Inﬂation Equation















ˆ Gt = µMUCtMC N
t Pθ−1
H,t YH,t + Etθpβ ˆ Gt+1 (22)
ˆ Ht = MUCtPθ−1
H,t YH,t + Etθpβ ˆ Ht+1. (23)
Let µ = θ
θ−1 be the ﬂexible-price equilibrium markup. Divide ˆ Gt by Pθ
H,t and ˆ Ht by
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= MUCtYt + Etθpβ ˜ Hθ−1


















the law of motion for the aggregate price index is:
P1−θ
H,t = θpP1−θ
H,t−1 +( 1− θp)PH,t(i)1−θ = θpP1−θ

















7.3.1 Loglinearization of Pricing Equation: non-zero steady state money growth
rate and inﬂation











where ΠH is the steady state inﬂation rate, also equal to the steady state money growth
r a t e .N o t et h a ti fw ea s s u m et h ef o r e i g np r i c ei n d e xP∗
F grows at the same steady state rate,
it is also true that Π = ΠH and the nominal exchange rate is constant. Then:
G
H
= µ ∗ MC∗
(1 − θpβΠθ−1)
(1 − θpβΠθ)
The steady state price index gives
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a n dz e r on e tf o r e i g na s s e t :
gt =( 1 − θpβΠθ)(muct + mct + yH,t)+ΠθθpβEt(gt+1 + θπH,t+1)












θpΠθ−1 (gt − ht)
Then substituting (gt − ht) in the inﬂation deﬁnition, obtain:
πH,t =( 1 − θpΠθ−1)(1 − θpβΠθ)
1
θpΠθ−1[mct] (26)
+(1 − θpΠθ−1)(1 − Π)
1
θpβΠθ−1(muct + yH,t)
+ΠβEtπH,t+1 +( 1− θpΠθ−1)(1 − Π)
1
θpΠθ−1βEtht+1
where lower-case letters indicate log-deviations of a variable from the steady state. See
Ascari (2004) for a derivation of the equation in a closed economy.
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Table 1: Inﬂation targeting countries in 1998. Data from the 1998 Bank of England
Survey and the de-facto exchange rate regime classiﬁcation in Rheinart and Rogoﬀ
(2002). Countries are not considered exchange rate targeters unless their de-facto
exchange rate regime is classiﬁed as freely ﬂoating or managed ﬂoating. Freely
falling countries are countries with average inﬂation rate higher then 40%. An
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Credibility, policy regime 
described as Inflation 
Targeting
0.05
Credibility, policy regime 





Credibility, de facto 
Exchange Rate Targeting
-0.14
Credibility, de facto 
Inflation Targeting
0.16
Table 2: Correlation coeﬃcient between declared or de-facto policy regime, and
credibility measure constructed from central bank independence scores reported in
the Bank of England 1998 survey.
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Credibility Index High Credibility   Medium Credibility Low Credibility 
Sample Size 18 36 27





Non inflation Targeting Ecuador Georgia Ghana




Thailand South Africa Norway
USA Zambia
Exchange Rate targeting Chile Argentina Austria
Denmark Armenia Botswana
Finland Belgium East. Caribbean
























Table 3: De facto policy regimes in countries ranked according to the credibility
index. High Credibility countries have a credibility index x>0.9. Low credibility
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Credibility Index High Credibility   Medium Credibility Low Credibility 
Sample Size 18 36 27
Inflation Targeting 16.70% 13.90% 3.70%
Exchange Rate Targeting 44.40% 69.40% 70.40%
Percentage of Floating 
Exchange Rate Countries 
which Adopted Inflation 
Targeting
30.00%  45.45% 12.50%
Percentage of countries with 
statutory focus on price 
stability
80.60% 49.30% 69.40%
Table 4: De-facto monetary policy regimes as a percentage of the sample size across
subsamples of countries enjoying diﬀerent levels of monetary policy credibility.
The Gain from Inconsistent Believes
Loss
Lb =[ ωπ =2 ,ω e =0 .1] , La =[ ωπ =2 ,ω e =0 .5] 0.25
La = Lb =[ ωπ =2 ,ω e =0 .1] 0.39
Table 5: Loss for believed policy equal to Lb and true policy equal to La.
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Degree of Openness Gamma = 0.4 Gamma = 0.2
Believed Policy Lb Loss








Fixed Exchange Rate 3.76 7.66
OmegaP= 0.1  Omegae = 1 8.74 232.45% 208.66% 15.57 203.28% 305.40%
OmegaP= 0.2  Omegae = 1 5.19 138.03% 185.09% 9.40 122.69% 255.61%
OmegaP= 0.3  Omegae = 0.95 3.92 104.26% 166.63% 7.04 91.90% 213.19%
OmegaP= 0.4  Omegae = 0.9 3.14 83.51% 168.55% 5.15 67.27% 176.93%
OmegaP= 0.5  Omegae = 0.85 2.33 61.97% 142.32% 4.23 55.23% 161.04%
OmegaP= 0.6  Omegae = 0.8 1.86 49.47% 129.69% 3.10 40.47% 133.35%
OmegaP= 0.8  Omegae = 0.7 1.3 34.57% 112.63% 2.15 28.08% 114.24%
Table 6: Loss for selected values of believed policy Lb. Annual steady state inﬂation
is 6%. Loss weights: λπH =1 ,λ c =1 ,λ i =0 . Relative loss computed as ratio of loss
for policy La|Lb (where La is true policy) and ﬁxed exchange rate. Implementation
gap is ratio [La|Lb − Lb|Lb]/Lb|Lb.
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  All Shocks Only Policy Shocks
Believed Policy Lb Loss








Fixed Exchange Rate 3.76 2.79
OmegaP= 0.1  Omegae = 1 8.74 232.45% 208.66% 8.54 305.90% 250.93%
OmegaP= 0.2  Omegae = 1 5.19 138.03% 185.09% 4.99 178.82% 250.37%
OmegaP= 0.3  Omegae = 0.95 3.92 104.26% 166.63% 3.67 131.48% 237.89%
OmegaP= 0.4  Omegae = 0.9 3.14 83.51% 168.55% 2.73 97.89% 228.14%
OmegaP= 0.5  Omegae = 0.85 2.33 61.97% 142.32% 1.94 69.64% 184.05%
Table 7: Loss for selected values of believed policy Lb. Annual steady state inﬂation
is 6%. Loss weights: λπH =1 ,λ c =1 ,λ i =0 . Relative loss computed as ratio of loss
for policy La|Lb (where La is true policy) and ﬁxed exchange rate. Implementation
gap is ratio [La|Lb − Lb|Lb]/Lb|Lb.
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Fixed Exchange Rate Loss 
ωπ 
Fixed Exchange Rate Loss 
Figure 1: Loss for believed policy Lb varying linearly in the range Llow
b =[ ωπ =
0.1,ωe =1 ]to L
high
b equal to true policy La =[ ωπ =2 ,ωe =0 .1],a n dχ =0 .8.
Annual steady state inﬂation is 6%. P a n e lA :L o s sw e i g h t s :λπH =1 ,λ c =1 ,λ i =0 .
P a n e lB :L o s sw e i g h t s :λπCPI =1 ,λ c =1 ,λ i =0 .
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Fixed Exchange Rate Loss
im perfect credibility - PPI Loss - Interest Rate objective
im perfect credibility - PPI Loss
i mperf ect credibili ty
full c redibility
Full C redibility Loss
Fixed Exchange Rate Loss 
Figure 2: Loss for believed policy Lb varying linearly in the range Llow
b =[ ωπ =
0.1,ωe =1 ]to L
high
b equal to true policy La =[ ωπ =2 ,ωe =0 .1],a n dχ =0 .8.
Annual steady state inﬂation is 6%. P a n e lA :L o s sw e i g h t s : λπCPI =1 ,λ c =1 ,
λi =0 . Panel B: compares loss for λπH =1 ,λ c =1 ,λ i =0with loss for λπH =1 ,
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THIN: full cred. ω p=2,χ=0.8,ω e=0.1    










                                               THICK: imperfect cred. L
b=[ω p=0.4,χ=0.8,ω e=0.9]






Figure 3: Impulse response function to an unanticipated annualized 1% drop in the
nominal interest rate it.T r u e p o l i c y La =[ ωπ =2 ,ω e =0 .1]. Under imperfect
credibility, private sector expects policy Lb =[ ωπ =0 .4,ω e =0 .9].T i m ei sm e a s u r e d
in years. Deviations are in percentage terms.
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im perfect credibility - PP I Loss - zero s teady state inflation
im perfect credibility - PP I Loss
Figure 4: Panel A: Loss for believed policy Lb varying linearly in the range Llow
b =
[ωπ =0 .1,ωe =1 ]to L
high
b equal to true policy La =[ ωπ =2 ,ωe =0 .1],a n dχ =0 .8.
Annual steady state inﬂation is 0%. Loss weights: λπH =1 ,λ c =1 ,λ i =0 . Straight
lines show ﬁxed exchange rate loss. Variation in ωe not shown. Panel B:Inﬂation
Targering Horizon for policy L v a r y i n gl i n e a r l yi nt h er a n g eLlow =[ ωπ =0 .1,ωe =1 ]
to Lhigh =[ ωπ =2 ,ωe =0 .1] under full credibility. The targeting horizon is the
number of quarters it takes for πH to revert to 0.1% above the steady state after an
unanticipated 1% expansionary policy shock.
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